Abstract-Recent advances in communication networks and cryptographic techniques have made possible to consider online voting systems as a feasible alternative to conventional elections. Until today several protocols for electronic voting have been proposed, unfortunately only a few of them have been implemented in an end-to-end fully functional system. In this paper we present a secure electronic voting system for medium scale on-line elections (SELES). Our system efficiently implements a security communication protocol offering protection against double voting and others frauds while avoiding any private voting channel. SELES accomplishes all the standard properties of conventional voting systems, namely, accuracy, democracy, privacy, verifiability, simplicity, flexibility and double voting detection. Our system has been tested in a distributed and heterogeneous Internet network comprised by workstations, laptops and PDA nodes interacting through wired and wireless connections. Additionally, SELES has been designed to deal with communication failures, thus achieving a certain degree of robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an electronic election system, privacy and security are mandatory features. However, it is not always obvious how to achieve these characteristics at a reasonable price, due to the fact that when an election process takes place, mechanisms that assure both, security and privacy may be too expensive for system administrators on one side, and inconvenient for users on the other.
Recent advances in communication networks and cryptographic techniques have made possible to consider on-line voting as a feasible alternative to conventional elections. Indeed, on-line electronic voting allows users to participate in an election no matter where they physically are at the moment of the voting process provided that they have a means of establishing a wired or wireless Internet connection to the system servers.
Additionally, an aggregated value of this kind of systems is its inherent privacy, since any one can participate actively within an election process without being seen by anyone. Notice that it would be almost impossible to achieve this feature when using a traditional election system.
Creating an on-line voting system requires the use of robust security mechanisms that are relatively complex to design. Accordingly, the study of security mechanisms in electronic elections has received considerable attention in the last twenty years. As a result, a wide variety of e-voting cryptographic protocols have been proposed The design of protocols based on homomorphic functions, requires rather complicated encryption schemes for hiding ballot's content in order to preserve voters' privacy [6] , [16] . Those protocols include two phases: ciphering and voting. To implement these phases, several techniques such as shared secret keys and zero-knowledge proofs have been proposed. However, an important drawback of homomorphic protocols is that they tend to produce high communication overhead along with a high computational complexity in the vote counting phase.
Blind Signatures were proposed in 1983 by Chaum [1]. Protocols based on blind signatures hide voter's identity, but still make the actual content of a vote visible to the authority. Protocols based on blind signatures generally consist of a registration phase followed by a voting phase.
In this paper we present an RSA/DSA-based e-voting protocol for online elections which can be regarded as an improvement of the scheme proposed in [10] . As a means of testing the correctness of the said protocol, we implemented in Java a fully-functional distributed e-voting system. We give a detailed explanation of the e-voting system's architecture and its corresponding dataflow. Finally, we evaluate the performance achieved by our system and compare it with other Proceedings of the Sixth Mexican International Conference on Computer Science (ENC'05) previously reported schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next Section, a summary of previous related work is outlined. In Section III, a description of the SELES protocol which is an improved version of Lin-Hwang-Chang's protocol is presented. Section IV discusses the rationale and implementation details behind the general architecture of the system developed. A performance and comparison evaluation of the system is presented in Section V. Finally, in Section VI some concluding remarks are drawn. Fujioka et al. [4] , developed a practical voting scheme using blind signatures. In their proposal, each voter signs his/her vote with a secret key, and then sends it to the counting center through an anonymous channel. One disadvantage of this scheme is that the protocol is complex since the voting phase consists of two steps.
II. RELATED WORK
In 1997, L. Cranor and R. Cytron [2] proposed and implemented a protocol based on Fujioka's scheme called Sensus. The main difference between both schemes is that Sensus allowed users to vote in a single session, whereas Fujioka's proposal required two sessions. However, one disadvantage of these schemes is that the network traffic increases since the voter is required to send the same ciphered messages twice, making the protocol less efficient.
On the contrary, in Wen-Sheng et al. scheme [8] , the network traffic is lower since every voter is allowed to send only a single anonymous message. Unfortunately, it has been shown that this scheme does not avoid vote duplication.
In 1998, Mu and Varadharajan [12] proposed two security schemes for electronic voting that addressed the issue of voter's privacy. The proposed schemes made use of RSA blind signatures along with ElGamal encryption scheme. These protocols were also able to detect vote duplicity.
In 1999, Karo and Wang [9] presented a security scheme for large scale electronic elections that did not used blind signatures. They suggested to utilize the HTTPS protocol to perform all transactions, instead of using an anonymous channel. However, the scheme was inefficient since six authorities were included in the model.
In 2001, Ray -Narasimhamurthi [13] designed a protocol that allowed anonymous voting through the internet. This protocol included three authorities and made use of digital certificates for voter authentication.
In 2003, Joaquim, Zúquete and Ferreira [7] presented a Java implementation of an electronic voting system called REVS. REVS implementation was based on the scheme proposed by DuRette [3] , which was itself an improvement of the EVOX system described by Herschberg [5] . In REVS, every valid vote should contain t signatures from the n administrative entities, where: t > n 2 . In 2003, showed one weakness in the scheme proposed by Mu and Varadharajan: the possibility that a user could vote more than once without being detected. Lin-Hwang-Chang also presented in
[10] an improvement to Mu and Varadharajan's protocol, adding a protection scheme against possible frauds based on the use of blind signatures. The proposed scheme did not require any special voting channel.
In this contribution we incorporate two amendments to the Lin-Hwang-Chang protocol in order to further improve its functionality. First, the usage of ElGamal encryption scheme in [10] was substituted by the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) scheme. By doing so, we show that independently of the random values that a voter and an authority server may choose, a vote will always be signed correctly before being sent to the voting server. Secondly, two extra encryption operations were added to the protocol dataflow in order to guarantee proper operation. A detailed description of this protocol is given in the next Section.
III. SELES VOTING PROTOCOL
SELES voting protocol consists of three phases: authentication, voting and counting. It considers the interaction of four entities, namely, voter (V), authentication server (AS), voting server (VS), and counting server (TCS). Cryptographic tools used by the protocol include digital certificates, time stamps, blind signatures and so on.
The notation that will be used to describe protocol's operation is as follows:
• V : voter • AS: authentication server • VS: voting server • TCS: counting server • t : time stamp • q : DSA parameter, 2 159 < q < 2
160
• p : given l such that 0 ≤ l ≤ 8, let p be a prime such that 2 511+64l < p < 2 512+64l , with the property that q divides (p − 1), i.e, q|(p − 1).
• g : a generator for Z * p
• Cert: digital certificate issued by an authority • {e x , d x }, n x : a pair of RSA keys for user x, where n x = p 1 × p 2 , p 1 and p 2 two large primes and e x × d x mod φ(n x ) = 1
In the rest of this Section, we summarize the main algorithm steps and dataflow performed during all three protocol phases.
A. Authentication
The authentication phase consists of three steps: 1) Voter chooses two blind factors b 1 and b 2 , and two random numbers k 1 and a. Using these values together with the DSA parameters, the values y, z 1 and z 2 are generated in the following way: 
